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for	 publication	 in	 the	Medical	 Law	Review	 following	peer	 review.	 The	












other,	 individuals	 may,	 assuming	 certain	 conditions	 are	 satisfied,	 travel	 to	 another	Member	
State	to	access	health	care.	This	 liberalisation,	which	 is	designed	to	extend	to	health	care	the	
operation	 of	 the	 internal	 market	 and	 competition	 rules,	 has	 given	 rise	 to	 a	 voluminous	







	 See,	 for	 example,	 C	 Newdick,	 ‘Citizenship,	 Free	 Movement	 and	 Health	 Care:	 Cementing	 Individual	 Rights	 by	








liberalisation	 of	 public	 welfare	 markets’	 upon	 the	 so-called	 ‘European	 social	 model’.3	 In	 the	
context	of	health	care,	this	analysis	manifests	itself	in	discussions	concerning	the	relative	effect	
of	liberalisation	on	the	nature	of	European	health	care	systems	–	which	have	traditionally	been	
founded	 upon	 principles	 of	 equity	 and	 solidarity.	 To	what	 extent	will	 liberalisation	 dilute,	 or	
even	eradicate,	these	‘social’	principles?	Is	a	movement	towards	establishing	EU	citizens’	rights	





solidarity?6	 	 These	 are	 interesting	 and	 important	 questions	 that	 go	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 EU’s	
desired	 value	 base	 in	 the	 context	 of	 health	 care.	 As	 such,	 what	 they	 have	 in	 common	 is	 a	
normative	 focus	 –	 that	 is,	 they	 revolve	 around	 questions	 of	 values	 and	 principles	 and	 the	
striking	of	an	appropriate	balance	between,	or	among,	them.	This	normative	approach	is	neatly	
illustrated	in	Hervey’s	discussion	of	the	European	social	model:	
In	 the	 context	of	health	policy,	 such	 [European	 social	model]	 values	may	 include	equality	of	 access	 to	health	
care	and	the	determinants	of	good	health,	solidarity	in	health	care	financing,	and	regulation	of	economic	activity	
as	 is	 necessary	 to	 protect	 and	 promote	 public	 health.	 Promoting	 the	 European	 social	 model	 is	 thus	 a	




















While	recognising	the	 importance	of	normative	questions,	 this	article’s	 focus	 is	different.	For,	
rather	than	analysing	what	the	desired	balance	of	values	and	principles	should	be	 in	the	EU’s	
emerging	jurisdiction	in	the	field	of	health	care,	it	considers	the	potential	consequences	of	this	




the	 analysis	 of	 this	 case	 in	 three	ways.	 First,	 and	 as	 indicated,	 it	moves	 the	 discussion	 away	























The	 article	 begins	 by	 providing	 a	 detailed	 explanation	 of	 the	 notions	 of	 juridification	 and	
medicalisation,	as	developed	in	the	work	of	Jürgen	Habermas	and	Ivan	Illich	respectively.	Those	
notions	will	form	the	framework	through	which	the	implications	of	the	Watts	case	and	the	new	






works	 to	 reverse	 medicine’s	 privilege	 over	 issues	 surrounding	 health	 and	 illness.	 The	 first	
section	of	the	article,	however,	seeks	to	dig	beneath	this	general	idea	of	medicalisation	in	order	
to	 unearth	 some	 of	 its	 specific	 features.	 Focusing	 on	 Illich’s	 work	 on	 the	 ‘expropriation	 of	
health’	 in	the	1970s,	and	what	 is	argued	here	to	be	one	example	of	 its	subsequent	reception	
within	 medical	 law	 (the	 work	 of	 Sheila	 McLean),	 a	 picture	 emerges	 of	 medicalisation	 as	
synonymous	 with	 bureaucracy,	 de-individualisation,	 and	 expropriation.	 The	 power	 of	
individuals	 to	manage	 their	 health	 and	 illness	 is	 supplanted	 by	 the	 bureaucratic	machine	 of	








there	 are	 parallels	 between	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 juridification	 –	 as	 developed	 in	 Habermas’s	
work	–	and	Illich’s	and	McLean’s	understandings	of	medicalisation.	In	particular,	it	will	become	
clear	 that	 the	 colonisation	 of	 non-legal	 and	 non-medical	 issues	 and	 problems	 by	 law	 and	
medicine,	and	the	theme	of	the	bureaucratic	nature	of	the	welfare	state,	are	common	features	
of	the	juridification	and	medicalisation	described	by	these	authors.	
The	 following	 three	 sections	 set	 out	 the	 substantive	material	 upon	which	 the	 analysis	 in	 the	
penultimate	section	of	the	article	is	based.	Thus,	section	two	provides	an	overview	of	how	the	
NHS	 fits	within	existing	models	of	European	health	 care	 systems.	This	 serves	 to	highlight	 the	
differences	between	‘benefits-in-kind’	(like	the	NHS)	and	‘refund’	systems.	In	particular,	it	helps	
to	 elucidate	 the	 more	 commoditised	 characteristics	 of	 the	 ‘refund’	 system.	 The	 following	
section	sets	out	the	facts	and	rulings	of	the	ECJ	in	the	Watts	case.	In	addition	to	this	descriptive	
purpose,	 the	 section	 also	 identifies	what	 is	 argued	 to	 be	 the	 political	 project	 underlying	 the	
ECJ’s	ruling	 in	the	case.	 It	 is	suggested	that	this	project	–	the	liberalisation	of	access	to	public	
health	 care	 services	within	 the	 EU	 –	 gives	 rise	 to	 a	 number	 of	 questions	 and	 issues	 that	 are	
inherently	political.	Completing	the	description	of	 the	relevant	 law,	section	 four	of	 the	article	
briefly	describes	and	discusses	the	new	EU	patients’	rights	Directive.	
In	 the	 final	 substantive	 section	of	 the	article	–	 section	 five	–	 the	notions	of	 juridification	and	











juridification	 and	medicalisation	 facilitates	 engagement	with	 the	broader	 issue	 that	might	 be	
taken	 to	 arise	 from	 Watts	 and	 the	 Directive	 –	 that	 is,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 contemporary	
relationship	between	 liberalisation,	 law,	medicine,	and	 the	welfare	 state.	This	 is,	of	 course,	a	
large	topic	and	no	attempt	is	made	here	to	present	an	exhaustive	analysis	of	it.	The	aim,	rather,	
is	 to	make	 a	 start	 in	 thinking	 about	 this	 broader	 issue	 –	 especially	 the	 structured	 nature	 of	
liberalisation	 and	 markets	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 health	 care	 –	 by	 deploying	 the	 notions	 of	
juridification	and	medicalisation.	In	doing	so,	the	argument	advanced	is	that	the	move	towards	
liberalisation	 and	 marketisation	 disclosed	 in	 EU	 law	 demands	 that	 we	 rethink	 some	 of	 the	
assumptions	 and	 foundations	 underlying	 those	 authors’	 analyses	 of	 juridification	 and	
medicalisation.	 In	 particular,	 the	 relevant	 law	 requires	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 notion	 of	
medicalisation	 as	 developed	 by,	 among	 others,	 Illich	 and	McLean,	 beyond	 a	 concern	 for	 the	
moral-ethical	question	of	the	liberty	of	individuals	vis-à-vis	health	and	illness,	to	incorporate	a	
focus	 on	 the	 relations	 between	 medicine	 and	 economic-related	 questions.	 Given	 the	












has	 been	 prepared	 to	 hold	 that	 the	 ‘economic’	 aspect	 is	 displaced’.11	 This	 is	 especially	 true	
where	 competition	 rules	 are	 applied	 by	 the	 ECJ	 to	 health	 care	matters.12	 The	 importance	 of	
acknowledging	Member	States’	power	to	protect	their	national	health	care	systems	has,	as	we	
will	see,	also	been	re-emphasised	in	the	recent	patients’	rights	Directive.	The	objective	here	is	
thus	 neither	 to	 dispute	 this	 nor,	 as	 indicated	 above,	 to	 advance	 suggestions	 as	 to	 how	 the	
balance	between	 the	economic	and	 the	social	might	better	be	 struck	 in	 the	 sphere	of	health	
care	at	the	EU	level.	Rather,	the	purpose,	at	least	in	part,	is,	by	way	primarily	of	an	analysis	of	









Press,	 2009)	 81,	 84.	 In	 the	 footnote	 to	 this	 quotation,	 Ross	 cites	 Case	 C-205/03	 P	 FENIN	 [2006]	 ECR	 I-6295	 to	
illustrate	this	point.	
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phenomena.	 One	 of	 its	 most	 famous	 exponents	 –	 Jürgen	 Habermas	 –	 has	 described	
juridification	as	follows:	
The	expression	‘juridification’	refers	quite	generally	to	the	tendency	toward	an	increase	in	formal	(or	positive,	
written)	 law	that	can	be	observed	 in	modern	society.	We	can	distinguish	here	between	the	expansion	of	 law,	
that	 is	the	legal	regulation	of	new,	hitherto	informally	regulated	social	matters,	from	the	 increasing	density	of	
law,	 that	 is,	 the	 specialized	 breakdown	 of	 global	 statements	 of	 the	 legally	 relevant	 facts	 into	more	 detailed	
statements.	Otto	Kirchheimer	introduced	the	term	[juridification]	 into	academic	discussion	during	the	Weimar	




For	 Habermas,	 then,	 juridification	 has	 two	 features.	 The	 first	 denotes	 the	 widening	 of	 the	
application	of	law	to	cover	areas	previously	regulated	only	informally;	while	the	latter	describes	
the	 process	 whereby	 ‘legal	 norms	 …	 tighten	 their	 hold	 …	 by	 way	 of	 increasingly	 detailed	
normative	standards	…	[T]here	is	an	observable	tendency	for	these	standards	to	become	more	
detailed	 in	 their	 specification	of	 the	 factual	 circumstances	 that	 are	being	 legally	 regulated’.14	
Habermas	explicates	juridification	by	identifying	four	‘juridification	thrusts’	that	have	occurred	
since	 the	 seventeenth	 century.	 Here,	 only	 the	 last	 of	 these	 –	 the	 welfare	 state	 –	 will	 be	
discussed.15	
According	 to	 Habermas,	 the	 development	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 can	 ‘be	 understood	 as	 the	
institutionalizing	 in	 legal	 form	 of	 a	 social	 power	 relation	 anchored	 in	 class	 structure.’	 –	
something	that	may	be	illustrated	in,	for	example,	the	emergence	of	collective	bargaining	in	the	
sphere	of	employment	and	 the	 limits	placed	on	 the	working	day.	 The	norms	and	 regulations	












guaranteeing	 juridification’	 –	 that	 is,	 they	 are	 intended	 to	 protect	 individuals	 against	 the	
consequences	of	the	operation	of	the	capitalist	economy	by,	for	 instance,	establishing	a	State	
pension	 or	 a	 health	 care	 system	 funded	 from	 the	 public	 purse.	 The	 essence	 of	 Habermas’s	
argument	 here	 is	 that	 the	 ‘freedom-guaranteeing	 juridification’	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 is	
ambivalent,	such	that	it	simultaneously	guarantees	freedom	and	takes	it	away.	He	argues	that	
this	arises	not	as	a	side	effect	of	juridification,	but	‘from	the	form	of	juridification	itself.	It	is	now	
the	very	means	of	 guaranteeing	 freedom	 that	endangers	 the	 freedom	of	 the	beneficiaries’.16	




of	 the	 bureaucratic	 state.	 Importantly,	 this	 system	 of	 individual	 legal	 entitlements	 ‘also	 has	




amongst	 other	 things,	 failing	 to	 pay	 due	 regard	 to	 the	 social	 conditions	 within	 which	 social	
questions	and	problems	originate:	‘The	situation	to	be	regulated	is	embedded	in	the	context	of	







	 Cotterrell	 helpfully	 summarises	 Habermas’s	 concept	 of	 the	 lifeworld	 as	 follows:	 ‘The	 lifeworld	 is	 the	





merely	 because	 it	 has	 to	 be	 subsumed	 under	 the	 law,	 but	 so	 that	 it	 can	 be	 dealt	 with	
administratively’.19	Ultimately,	this	leads	Habermas	to	note	the:	







the	 legal	 system,	 this	 is	 not	 the	 only	 possible	 understanding	 of	 the	 phenomenon.21	 For	
juridification	has	also	been	viewed	as	a	political,	rather	than	a	legal,	problem.	Habermas	himself	
draws	attention	to	this	political	understanding	of	juridification	in	the	quotation	at	the	beginning	
of	 this	 section,	where	 he	 refers	 to	 Kirchheimer’s	 use	 of	 juridification	 to	 refer	 to	 ‘the	 juristic	
containment	of	social	conflicts	and	political	struggles’.	Here,	‘political	disputes	or	problems	are	




technical	 and	 professional	 questions	 …	 In	 parts	 this	 happens	 by	 the	 jurist’s	 raising	 the	 fundamental	 legal	
question	 of	 whether	 there	 exists	 a	 ‘legal	 authority’	 or	 ‘legal	 basis’	 for	 given	 actions;	 in	 short,	 whether	 the	






















search	 for	 the	 correct	 legal	 precedent	 or,	 as	Mathiesen	 says,	 the	 appropriate	 legal	 basis	 for	




Rather	 than	 juridification,	 it	 is	medicalisation	 that	 has	 been	 the	 object	 of	 critical	 analysis	 for	
some	medical	 lawyers.	 Indeed,	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 the	 critique	 of	medicalisation	 has	 been	
instrumental	in	giving	rise	to	the	area	of	research	that	has	come	to	be	known	as	medical	 law.	
Like	the	second	–	political	–	form	of	juridification	described	above,	it	has	been	argued	that	the	
essence	 of	 medicalisation	 lies	 in	 the	 conversion	 of	 traditionally	 non-medical	 problems	 and	
issues	–	namely,	health	and	illness	–	into	medical	ones.	In	a	book	that	could	be	considered	to	
have	been	 influential	 in	 inspiring	 the	 critique	of	medicalisation	within	medical	 law,	 Ivan	 Illich	
criticises	 the	 power	 of	 medicine	 in	 modern	 society	 and	 what	 he	 calls	 its	 ‘expropriation	 of	
health’.24	 Medicine,	 he	 argues,	 has	 developed	 a	 monopoly	 over	 health	 care	 and	 deprived	
citizens	 of	 their	 autonomous	 powers	 to	 manage	 their	 health:	 ‘Society	 has	 transferred	 to	
physicians	the	exclusive	right	to	determine	what	constitutes	sickness,	who	is	or	might	become	
sick,	and	what	shall	be	done	to	such	people’.25	This	‘threatens	to	destroy	the	environmental	and	
cultural	 conditions	 needed	 by	 people	 to	 live	 a	 life	 of	 constant	 autonomous	 healing’.26	What	
emerges	as	a	core	feature	of	Illich’s	understanding	of	medicalisation,	then,	is	how	medicine	and	
medical	 professionals	 have	 expropriated	 or	 colonised	 the	 ability	 of	 individuals	 to	 care	 for	
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themselves	where	health	 is	concerned.	 It	 is	 ‘self-reliance’,	 ‘autonomy’,	 ‘personal	growth’,	and	
‘personal	responsibility’	 in	the	field	of	health	care	that	are	the	casualties	of	medicalisation;	to	
put	it	differently,	a	key	component	of	medicalisation	is	its	de-individualising	quality.	
As	 well	 as	 de-individualisation,	 Illich	 identifies	 the	 decoupling	 of	 medicine	 and	 morality	 as	
another	 feature	 of	 what	 he	 calls	 ‘the	 medicalization	 of	 life’.	 Medical	 ethics	 have	 been	
supplanted	by	the	technical,	scientific	nature	of	medicine	–	a	supposed	value-free	discipline	–	
and	the	courts	and	the	law	have	done	nothing	to	challenge	this:	‘The	courts	and	the	law,	when	
they	 are	 not	 used	 to	 enforce	 the	 Aesculapian	 monopoly,	 are	 turned	 into	 doormen	 of	 the	
hospital	who	select	from	among	the	clients	those	who	can	meet	the	doctors’	criteria’.27	Aligned	
to	 this	 is	 the	 bureaucratic	 nature	 of	 what	 Illich	 defines	 as	 medicalisation.	 Like	 Habermas’s	




culture	 taught	 each	man,	 are	now	 claimed	by	 technocracy	 as	 new	areas	of	 policy-making	 and	 are	 treated	 as	
malfunctions	 from	which	 populations	 ought	 to	 be	 institutionally	 relieved.	 The	 goals	 of	metropolitan	medical	




In	 Habermas’s	 language,	 it	 could	 be	 said	 that	 this	 sort	 of	 medicalisation	 involves	 the	












a	 key	 problem	 of,	 and	 for,	 law	 –	 not	 least	 as	 Illich	 envisaged	 the	 recognition	 of	 his	 desired	
return	to	autonomous	action	as	being	optimally	secured	via	 legal	 (and	political)	procedures.29	
Illich’s	 influence	 in	 this	 regard	 can	 be	 seen,	 for	 instance,	 in	 Sheila	 McLean’s	Old	 Law,	 New	
Medicine.30	In	this	book,	McLean	is	critical	of	the	ways	in	which	not	only	‘human	problems	and	
human	 values	 become	medicalised’,	 but	 how	 the	 law	 is	 complicit	 in	 helping	 to	 produce	 this	
state	of	affairs.	Through	its	deference	to	medicine	and	medical	professionals,	McLean	argues,	
law	 sustains	 medicalisation	 and	 disenfranchises	 the	 individual	 as	 a	 result.	 Like	 Illich,	 then,	
McLean	views	medicalisation	as	constituting,	on	the	one	hand,	an	expropriation	by	medicine	of	
human	 values	 and	 problems,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 a	 process	 that	 de-individualises.	 This	 latter	
consequence	 amounts	 to	 a	 failure	 to	 respect	 the	 autonomy	 of	 patients	 and,	 specifically,	 to	
acknowledge	their	 liberty	 to	make	decisions	 regarding	 their	medical	 treatment.	As	with	 Illich,	
McLean’s	critique	of	medicalisation	here	resides	in	the	failure	to	pay	due	regard	to	civil	liberty	–	
that	is,	freedom	from	interference	(in	one’s	body	and	in	the	decisions	one	wishes	to	take	on	the	
basis	 of	 one’s	 personal	 value	 or	 belief	 system).	 In	 short,	 medicalisation	 prevents	 individuals	
being	 left	 alone	 to	 make	 decisions	 about	 medical	 treatment	 which	 will	 subsequently	 be	













is	 a	 human,	 rather	 than	 a	 medical,	 phenomenon,	 and	 of	 upholding	 individual	 self-
determination.	
What	are	the	key	points	to	be	extracted	from	this	brief	tour	of	juridification	and	medicalisation?	
From	 the	 authors	 discussed	 here,	 these	 phenomena	 share	 two	 principal	 features.	 First,	 they	
capture	processes	of	expropriation	in	which	problems,	issues	and	conflicts	are	torn	from	their	
original	settings	or	conditions	and	made	subject	to	law	and/or	medicine.	Various	consequences	
flow	 from	 such	 processes,	 including	 the	 denial	 of	 freedom;	 the	 disregard	 for	 the	 social	 and	
cultural	conditions	and	relations	of	what	Habermas	calls	the	lifeworld;	and	the	depoliticisation	
of	 fundamental	 political	 issues,	 questions,	 and	 conflicts.	 Secondly,	 juridification	 and	
medicalisation	are	closely	related	to	what	is	taken	to	be	the	bureaucratic	nature	of	the	welfare	
state.	Underlying	 the	analyses	of	 juridification	and	medicalisation	 set	out	here	 is,	 in	effect,	 a	
critique	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 for	 its	 perceived	 technocracy,	 scientism,	 and	 soullessness.	 The	
medicine	and	law	of	the	welfare	state	are	thought	to	function	in	such	a	way	as	to	deprive	the	
individual	 of	 power	 and	 freedom,	 and	 to	 ensure,	 instead,	 the	 efficient	 workings	 of	 an	




McLean	 and	 Illich	 argue	 that	 rights	 –	 in	 McLean’s	 case	 human	 rights	 –	 constitute	 the	 best	
method	 of	 reversing	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 medicalisation	 and,	 thus,	 of	 recognising	 the	












European	 health	 care	 systems,	 its	 scope	 is	 universal	 in	 that	 it	 covers	 the	 entire	 national	
population	 (those	 who	 are	 ‘ordinarily	 resident’	 in	 the	 UK).	 Its	 guiding	 principle,	 frequently	
reiterated	by	UK	Governments,	is	that	access	to	medical	treatment	and	health	care	services	is	
based	 on	 clinical	 need	 and	 not	 the	 ability	 to	 pay.31	 The	 NHS,	 however,	 differs	 in	 important	
respects	 from	 some	 other	 European	 social	 health	 care	 systems.32	 Unlike	 what	 is	 called	 the	
‘insurance’	model,	 in	which	social	health	care	 is	 funded	through	contributions	employees	and	
employers	make	to	specific	insurance	funds,	as	noted	the	NHS	is	directly	financed	by	the	state	
through	 taxation.	 Its	 underlying	 foundation	 is	 thus	 citizenship,	 rather	 than	 participation	 in	 a	





















private	 (the	 latter	 having	 a	 contract	 with	 the	 state	 to	 provide	 social	 health	 care)	 –	 without	
having	to	pay	for	it	up	front.	While	the	cost	of	treatment	delivered	by	public	bodies	is	settled	
directly	 by	 the	 state,	 in	 the	 case	 of	 private	 providers,	 usually	 a	 flat	 annual	 fee	 is	 payable,	
together	 with	 ‘a	 fee	 per	 capita	 of	 patient	 treated,	 plus	 actual	 expenses	 incurred’.35	 As	
Hatzopoulos	notes:	‘In	this	system	the	choice	of	patients	is	more	restricted	...	Healthcare	under	
this	 system	 is	 seen	 more	 as	 a	 public	 good	 to	 which	 access	 should	 be	 ensured	 in	 all	



















the	 patient	 might	 better	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 consumer	 selecting	 treatment(s)	 from	 a	 variety	 of	
health	care	providers.	
It	 is	 worth	 stressing	 that	 such	 a	 commoditised	 vision	 of	 health	 care	 directly	 contradicts	 the	
founding	principles	of	the	NHS.	As	well	as	making	clinical	need	and	not	the	ability	to	pay	the	key	
determinant	 of	 access	 to	 health	 care	 services,	 at	 its	 inception	 the	NHS	 encapsulated	 a	more	
general	 vision	 of	 the	 nature	 of	 human	 relations.	 In	 the	 first	 instance,	 this	 was	 apparent	 in	
Beveridge’s	blueprint	for	the	establishment	of	a	welfare	state	within	the	UK.37	There,	guided	by	
the	 objective	 of	 abolishing	what	 he	 termed	 the	 five	 ‘Giant	 Evils’	 of	Want,	 Idleness,	 Squalor,	
Ignorance,	 and	 Disease,	 Beveridge	 noted	 that	 a	 key	 plank	 of	 this	 task	 had	 to	 be	 the	




basis	of	which	 implied	 ‘that	men	stand	 together	with	 their	 fellows’.39	As	 John	Harrington	has	
noted,	 the	architect	of	 the	NHS,	Nye	Bevan,	was	 to	entrench	and	 flesh	out	 this	 vision	of	 the	
UK’s	 new	 health	 care	 system.40	 Not	 only	 was	 health	 care	 not	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 simply	 another	
commodity	 to	be	bought	and	sold;	 it	was	also	designed	 to	be	a	vehicle	 for	 the	promotion	of	
more	 fundamental	 human	 values	 such	 as	 altruism	 and	 solidarity.	 Bevan	 thought	 that	 these	



















can	be	 seen	 in	 the	 framework	 that	has	emerged	 to	allocate	health	care	 resources	within	 the	
NHS	 in	 conditions	 where	 demand	 for	 access	 to	 treatment	 outstrips	 supply.	 The	 inevitable	
rationing	of	resources	that	this	reality	entails	has	resulted	in	the	operation	of	the	‘waiting	list’	
system,	 whereby,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 assessment	 of	 general	 clinical	 priorities,	 local	 health	
authorities	set	times	within	which	individuals	can	expect	to	receive	treatment	for	their	specific	
illnesses.41	 Rather	 than	 access	 to	medical	 treatment	 being	 determined	 by	 individual	 demand	
and	 choice,	 such	 a	 system	 seeks	 to	 implement	 a	measure	 of	 fairness	 by	 ensuring	 that	 those	
with	 the	most	pressing	clinical	needs	obtain	access	 to	 treatment	 first.	As	Newdick	has	noted,	
this	displays	elements	of	solidarity,	in	the	sense	that	‘the	needs	of	the	individual	are	balanced	
with	 those	 of	 the	 community’.42	 Decisions	 about	 whether	 particular	 individuals	 ought	 to	 be	
given	 access	 to	NHS	 treatment	must	 be	made	 by	 taking	 due	 account	 of	 both	 the	 scarcity	 of	
resources	and	the	needs	of	others.	This	approach	is	supported	by	the	benefits-in-kind	nature	of	











scarce	 health	 care	 resources.	 At	 one	 level,	 this	 reflects	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 is	 the	 national	
government	of	the	day	that	determines	the	annual	budget	of	the	NHS.	How	much	is	devoted	to	
health	 care	 each	 year	 must	 be	 decided	 in	 the	 context	 of	 overall	 government	 spending	 and	










In	2006,	 the	ECJ	handed	down	 its	 ruling	 in	 the	Watts	 case.	 The	 case	 involved	a	Mrs.	 Yvonne	
Watts	who	travelled	to	France,	had	a	hip	replacement	operation,	paid	for	it,	and	on	her	return,	
claimed	 to	be	entitled	 to	 reimbursement	 from	NHS	 funds.	Under	EU	 law,	 reimbursement	 for	
hospital	 treatment	 received	 in	 another	 EU	 Member	 State	 is	 possible,	 but	 only	 if	 you	 have	
received	prior	authorisation	 from	your	 local	primary	care	 trust.	While	Mrs.	Watts	had	sought	
such	authorisation,	it	had	been	refused.	Her	claim	for	the	cost	of	the	operation	was	dismissed	






















objective	 medical	 assessment	 of	 the	 patient’s	 medical	 condition,	 the	 history	 and	 probable	
course	of	his	illness,	the	degree	of	pain	he	was	in	and/or	the	nature	of	his	disability	at	the	time	
when	 the	 request	 for	 authorisation	 was	 made	 or	 renewed’.	 So,	 if	 the	 waiting	 time	 for	 an	
operation	on	the	NHS	is	12	months,	but	an	‘objective	medical	assessment’	of	a	patient’s	clinical	







extension,	 to	 receive)	 services	 extended	 to	 health	 care	 services	 and	 covered	 the	 NHS.	 This	
added	 a	 further	 legal	 route	 for	 patients	 wishing	 to	 obtain	 hospital	 treatment	 abroad	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 the	 NHS.	 Previously,	 the	 only	 avenue	 lay	 under	 A22	 of	 Council	 Regulation	 (EEC)	
1408/71.	Assuming	 the	 treatment	 sought	 abroad	 is	 one	of	 the	benefits	provided	by	 the	NHS	
and	 that	 the	 patient	 cannot	 receive	 this	 treatment	 via	 the	 NHS	 ‘within	 the	 time	 normally	




[A56	 TFEU]	 in	 this	 context	 broadens	 the	 legal	 basis	 of	 the	 right	 to	 obtain	 hospital	 treatment	
elsewhere	 in	 the	EU	by	making	 it	 an	 aspect	of	 the	 general	 freedom	 to	provide	 (and	 receive)	
services.	Assuming	 the	patient	 is	 suffering	 ‘undue	delay’	 (defined	above)	within	 the	NHS,	 the	
local	primary	care	trust	must	authorise	the	request	for	treatment	to	be	obtained	abroad.	Under	
A49	[A56	TFEU],	patients	may	choose	to	obtain	their	hospital	treatment	from	any	foreign	health	
care	 provider	 (whether	 state	 or	 private).	 The	 patient	 pays	 the	 overseas	 provider	 for	 the	
treatment	 up	 front	 and	 then	 claims	 reimbursement	 of	 the	 cost	 from	 the	 NHS.	 The	 amount	
recovered	may	not	exceed	the	cost	of	the	treatment,	had	it	been	performed	within	the	NHS.	
The	three	arguments	advanced	by	the	UK	Government	in	Watts	provide	a	route	into	the	types	
of	 issues	 with	 which	 this	 article	 is	 concerned.45	 The	 first	 argument	 was	 that	 allowing	 NHS	
																																																																		
45




patients	 to	 travel	 to	 another	 Member	 State	 to	 receive	 hospital	 treatment	 earlier	 than	 they	
would	 obtain	 it	 on	 the	 NHS	would	 adversely	 affect	 the	manner	 in	 which	 scarce	 health	 care	
resources	were	allocated	within	the	NHS	–	that	is,	through	the	waiting	list	system.	This	would	
risk	 causing	 financial	 imbalance	within	 the	NHS,	 as	 refunding	patients	who	had	been	 treated	
abroad	would	reduce	the	resources	available	 for	those	 in	need	of	urgent	treatment	at	home,	
thereby	 compromising	 the	 NHS’s	 ability	 to	 fulfil	 its	 role	 as	 a	 provider	 of	 adequate	 levels	 of	
health	care.	The	Secretary	of	State	argued	that	waiting	lists	should	be	the	appropriate	measure	
of	whether	patients	would	suffer	undue	delay	in	being	treated,	as	these	waiting	times	and	the	






UK	 hospital	 would	 no	 doubt	 differ,	 causing	 problems	 in	 allocating	 resources.	 Finally,	 the	
Secretary	of	State	argued	that,	owing	to	the	specific	nature	of	the	NHS	–	including	the	fact	that	
it	 operated	 a	 benefits-in-kind	 system	 and	 was	 a	 non-profit-making	 body	 –	 it	 could	 not	 be	
deemed	 to	 constitute	 a	 ‘service’	 under	 Article	 50	 of	 the	 EC	 Treaty	 (now	 A57	 TFEU),	 as	 its	
services	were	 not	 ‘provided	 for	 remuneration’.	 Consequently,	 it	 could	 not	 be	 subject	 to	 the	
freedom	to	provide	(and	receive)	services	provision	 in	Article	49	of	the	EC	Treaty	[A56	TFEU].	
This	contrasted	with	the	health	care	systems	of	some	other	EU	Member	States,	such	as	France	










of	medical	 priorities	 have	 a	 collective	 objective,	which	 is	 directed	 at	 allocating	 scarce	 health	






The	 response	 of	 the	 ECJ	 to	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State’s	 arguments	 directly	 challenges	 both	 the	
principles	 of	 the	 NHS	 and	 the	 political	 claim	 to	 legitimacy	 underlying	 those	 arguments.	 For	
while	the	ECJ	stressed	in	 its	ruling	that	 its	 interpretation	of	the	relevant	EU	law	did	not	mean	
that	 budgetary	 considerations	 in	 the	 planning	 of	 NHS	 waiting	 lists	 were	 irrelevant	 when	






capacity	 in	 their	 territory	 by	 the	 use	 of	waiting	 lists	 [not	 being	 undermined	 by	 the	 ruling	 in	
Watts],	provided	 that	 the	existence	of	 such	 lists	does	not	prevent	 the	 taking	account	 in	each	
individual	 case	 of	 the	medical	 circumstances	 and	 the	 clinical	 needs	 of	 the	 person	 concerned	
when	he	requests	authorisation	to	receive	hospital	treatment	in	another	Member	State	at	the	
expense	of	 the	system	with	which	he	 is	 registered’.46	 In	other	words,	EU	 law	will	be	 liable	 to	
undermine	this	 ‘power	to	manage	the	available	hospital	capacity’	should	the	clinical	needs	of	
individual	 patients	 not	 be	 taken	 into	 account.	 The	 recognition	 by	 the	 ECJ	 of	 the	 ‘overriding	
national	objectives	relating	to	management	of	the	available	hospital	capacity,	control	of	health	
expenditure	and	financial	balance	of	social	security	systems’	is	thus	not,	as	it	claims,	balanced	
against	 ‘the	 objective	 of	 the	 free	 movement	 of	 patients’	 but	 dependent	 on	 the	 national	






treatment	 for	 consideration;	 in	 this	 context,	 the	 resolution	of	 the	 ‘service’	 status	of	 the	NHS	
was	superfluous.	The	NHS	was	therefore	subject	to	A49	of	the	EC	Treaty	[A56	TFEU].	
These	rulings	challenge	the	underlying	nature	and	values	of	the	NHS	inherent	in	the	Secretary	







medical	 treatment	amongst	members	of	 the	national	population	via	 the	operation	of	waiting	
lists.	As	noted	above,	this	is	because	findings	of	undue	delay	may	result	in	those	patients	who	
require	 urgent	 hospital	 treatment	 having	 to	wait	 longer	 for	 it,	 as	 the	 resources	 assigned	 for	




determining	 the	 timing	of	access	 to	 treatment	domestically,	based	upon	a	 system	of	medical	
priorities	 at	 a	 macro	 level	 (through	 the	 construction	 of	 waiting	 lists),	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	
accessing	 treatment	within	 the	 EU,	 the	 ECJ	 demands	 that	 clinical	 judgment	 focus,	 rather,	 on	





and	guiding	values,	 the	 rulings	 in	Watts	have	 implications	at	what	might	be	described	as	 the	
political	 level.	 It	 is	 suggested	 that	 these	 implications	 flow	 from	 a	 concrete	 political	 project	
emerging	at	the	EU	level	to	ensure	what,	as	noted	earlier,	Szyszczak	calls	‘the	liberalisation	of	
public	welfare	markets’.	It	is	important	to	re-emphasise	that	the	ECJ’s	rulings	across	the	field	of	
health	 care	 do	 not	 point	 invariably	 in	 the	 direction	 of	 establishing	 a	 blanket	 liberalisation	 of	





project	 is	being	established	 through	EU	 law	and	 the	 types	of	 consequences	accompanying	 it.	
This	 analysis	 will	 take	 place	 in	 the	 penultimate	 section	 of	 this	 article	 and	will	 be	 conducted	
through	the	analytical	framework	of	juridification	and	medicalisation	set	out	earlier.	It	is	worth,	
however,	briefly	laying	some	of	the	groundwork	for	this	analysis	here.	











can	 be	 thought	 to	 display	 strong	 ‘public’	 characteristics,	 other	 systems,	 such	 as	 France,	 are	
more	‘private’	in	nature,	as	patients	can	elect	to	receive	treatment	from	a	public	or	commercial	
health	care	provider	and	pay	up	 front	 for	 their	 treatment	 (later	seeking	 reimbursement	 from	
the	relevant	 insurer).	A	crucial	distinction	that	May	LJ	alludes	to	 lies	 in	the	absence	of	a	right	
within	the	NHS	to	be	treated	by	a	private	health	care	provider	at	public	expense.	If	this	is	not	
available	to	patients	within	the	NHS,	 then	why,	May	LJ	asks,	should	 it	be	so	abroad,	with	the	
consequence	 that	 NHS	 resources	 are	 diverted	 to	 support	 commercial	 health	 care	 providers	






other	Member	 States	 should	 act	 as	 the	 source	of	 an	obligation	upon	 the	UK	Government	 to	
plough	further	money	into	the	NHS	to	plug	the	gap	created	by	this	diversion	of	resources.	
These	questions	are	not	answered	by	the	ECJ	in	its	ruling;	rather,	its	response	is	simply	to	apply	
EU	 law	with	 the	 objective	 of	 developing	 the	 EU	 internal	 market	 and	 the	 free	movement	 of	
services.	 Irrespective	of	 the	nature	of	 the	health	care	provider	 (public/private),	patients	must	
be	able	 to	 travel	 to	other	EU	Member	States	 to	receive	hospital	 treatment	at	a	point	 in	 time	
when	 they	 should,	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 an	 objective	 medical	 assessment,	 have	 been	 entitled	 to	
obtain	 it	at	home.	And	 irrespective	of	 the	makeup	of	 individual	Member	States’	 social	health	
care	 systems	 (taxation/insurance;	 benefits-in-kind/refund),	 each	 one	 must	 reimburse	 such	
hospital	 treatment.	 Otherwise,	 the	 internal	 market	 will	 not	 work.	 The	 upshot	 is	 that,	 even	
though	NHS	 resources	 do	 not	 support	 private	 health	 care	 providers	 of	 hospital	 treatment	 at	
home	 by	 means	 of	 a	 patient	 entitlement	 to	 utilise	 their	 services,	 after	 Watts,	 they	 must	















questions	 that	give	 rise	 to	 conflicts	 and	debates	over	 the	 shape	our	 societies	and	 its	welfare	
institutions	 should	 take	 –	 conflicts	 and	 debates	 one	 might	 assume	 would	 be	 managed	 and	
conducted	not	only	by	the	political	institutions	of	Member	States,	but	especially	by	those	who	
pay	their	taxes.	These	questions	and	issues	should,	thus,	be	viewed	as	properly	political	ones.	In	
order	 to	 think	 through	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 ruling	 in	Watts	 on,	 inter	 alia,	 how	 these	 types	 of	
political	 questions	and	 issues	are	managed	by	 law,	 the	 relationship	between	 law	and	politics	
where	 NHS	 resources	 are	 allocated	 in	 domestic	 cases,	 and	 the	 broader	 role	 of	 the	















	 For	 a	 fuller	 analysis	 of	 the	 Directive,	 see	 W	 Sauter,	 ‘Harmonisation	 in	 Healthcare:	 the	 EU	 Patients’	 Rights	
Directive’	TILEC	Discussion	Paper	No.	2011-030	(2011).	
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legislation	 that	 gathers	 together	 the	 ECJ	 principles	 developed	 in	 those	 cases	 and	 expresses	
them	in	a	way	that	is	both	more	general	and	leads	to	their	enhanced	practical	implementation.	
The	consequence	of	this	codifying	objective	is	that	much	of	the	Directive	merely	reiterates	the	
principles	established	by	the	ECJ	 in	Watts	 (and	other	cases)	and	which	were	set	out	earlier	 in	
this	article.	Thus,	the	Directive	highlights	the	ECJ’s	consistent	protection	of	the	right	of	Member	
States	 to	 limit	 the	 reimbursement	 of	 cross-border	 healthcare	 –	 and	 therefore	 restrict	 the	
freedom	of	movement	provisions	of	 the	Treaties	–	 for	a	variety	of	 reasons,	amongst	which	 is	
the	 ground	 of	 ‘overriding	 reasons	 of	 general	 interest’.	 Such	 reasons	 include	 planning	
requirements	 relating	 to	 the	 aim	 of	 ensuring	 sufficient	 and	 permanent	 access	 to	 a	 balanced	
















reimbursement	 of	 cross-border	 healthcare	 and,	 thereby,	 restrict	 the	 freedom	 of	 movement	
provisions	 in	 the	 Treaties	 –	 not	 to	 avoid	 them	 completely.	 As	 noted,	 the	 objective	 of	 the	
Directive	is	to	set	out	rules	by	which	to	improve	the	functioning	of	the	internal	market	and	the	
free	movement	 of	 goods,	 persons	 and	 services,	 rather	 than	 to	 create	mechanisms	 by	which	
Member	States	can	circumvent	these.	As	the	Directive’s	Preamble	makes	clear:	 ‘As	confirmed	
by	 the	 Court	 of	 Justice,	 neither	 its	 special	 nature	 nor	 the	 way	 in	 which	 it	 is	 organised	 or	
financed	 removes	healthcare	 from	 the	ambit	of	 the	 fundamental	principle	of	 the	 freedom	to	
provide	services’.54	Moreover,	the	main	method	of	seeking	to	limit	the	reimbursement	of	cross-
border	 healthcare	 envisaged	 by	 the	 Directive	 –	 prior	 authorisation	 –	 creates	 difficulties	 for	
Member	States	of	affiliation	who	seek	to	rely	on	the	planning	exception.	Again,	one	needs	to	













to	 enable	 freedom	 to	provide	healthcare	 for	 patients	 and	 to	 remove	unjustified	obstacles	 to	
that	fundamental	freedom	within	the	patient’s	Member	State	of	affiliation’.55	 Indeed,	as	prior	
authorisation	has	been	deemed	by	the	ECJ	to	constitute	a	restriction	to	the	free	movement	of	
services,	 the	 general	 rule	 is	 that	 Member	 States	 of	 affiliation	 should	 not	 make	 the	
reimbursement	of	the	costs	of	health	care	received	in	another	Member	State	subject	to	prior	
authorisation,	 where	 these	 costs	 would	 have	 borne	 by	 the	 national	 health	 system,	 had	 the	
treatment	been	received	within	the	Member	State	of	affiliation.	
Where	a	system	of	prior	authorisation	is	justified	on	the	basis	of	the	planning	exception	and	in	
place,	 the	 foundation	 for	 its	operation	–	 that	 is,	 the	grant	and	refusal	of	 this	authorisation	 in	
specific	cases	–	does	not	reside	in	the	‘overriding	reasons	of	general	interest’	criterion.	Rather,	
the	 criteria	 shift	 to	 become	 much	 more	 focused	 on	 medical	 and	 healthcare	 outcomes	 and	


















State	 of	 treatment	must,	 in	 principle,	 be	 granted	 –	 unless	 any	 of	 the	 safety-risk	 criteria	 just	
mentioned	 are	 satisfied.	 It	 is	 clear,	 then,	 that	 determinations	 regarding	 the	 refusal	 of	 prior	
authorisation	have	the	same	basis	in	the	Directive	as	they	do	in	the	ruling	of	the	ECJ	in	Watts	–	
namely,	an	objective	medical	assessment	of	individual	patients;	or	what	was	referred	to	earlier	
in	 this	 article	 as	 ‘the	 individualisation	 of	 clinical	 judgment’.	 The	 Directive	makes	 this	 doubly	
clear	 for	 health	 systems	 such	 as	 the	NHS	when	 it	 reiterates	 in	 its	 Preamble	 the	 point	 about	






notes,	 have	 been	 generously	 extended	 in	 the	 Directive)	 –	 decisions	 regarding	 the	 grant	 and	
refusal	 of	 prior	 authorisation	 must	 be	 based	 on	 medical	 criteria	 and	 judgments	 focused	
predominantly	 on	 the	 individual.	 This	 is	 important	 as	 it	 is	 at	 this	 grant/refusal	 stage	 of	 prior	
authorisation	that	the	flow	of	health	care	resources	abroad	and	the	effective	 implementation	
of	 the	 free	 movement	 rules	 are	 determined.	 The	 problem	 is	 that	 at	 the	 very	 moment	 the	
Member	State	of	affiliation,	which	does	not	wish	to	divert	 its	scarce	health	care	resources	 to	
health	 care	providers	 abroad,	might	wish	 to	 raise	 the	planning	exception	 to	prevent	 such	an	








Directive	 has	 little	 effect.	 For,	 while	 it	 gives	 more	 prominence	 and	 scope	 to	 the	 planning	
exception	as	a	determinant	of	the	need	to	establish	a	system	of	prior	authorisation,	it	leaves	in	
place	 the	medicalised	and	 individualised	nature	of	 the	criteria	used	 to	determine	whether	or	
not	 prior	 authorisation	 is,	 in	 fact,	 to	 be	 granted.	 Crucially,	 it	 also	 confirms	 that,	 like	 A49	 EC	
Treaty	[A56	TFEU],	the	Directive	will	apply	to	cross-border	health	care	provided	by	private,	as	
well	 as	 public,	 health	 care	 providers.59	 Moreover,	 the	 importance	 of	 ensuring	 that	






What	 light	 can	 the	 notions	 of	 juridification	 and	 medicalisation	 shed	 on	 the	 liberalisation	 of	
hospital	 care	 services	 provided	 for	 by	 the	 ECJ’s	 ruling	 in	Watts,	 and	 the	 reiteration	 of	 its	
principles	 in	 the	 Directive?	 That	 is	 the	 question	 with	 which	 the	 discussion	 in	 this	 section	 is	












the	relationship	between	 law	and	politics	 in	 the	context	of	access	 to	health	care,	and	 for	 the	
role	of	the	welfare	state	(here	represented	in	the	form	of	the	NHS)	today	vis-à-vis	the	market.	
A.	 Expropriation	and	Depoliticisation	
In	 the	 first	 instance,	Watts	 can	 be	 read	 as	 an	 instance	 of	 expropriation.	 This	 expropriation	
amounts	 to	 the	 depoliticisation	 of	 the	 fundamental	 political	 issues,	 questions,	 and	 conflicts	




the	 ECJ’s	 ruling.	 As	 noted,	 whether	 or	 not	 undue	 delay	 exists	 in	 particular	 cases	 is	 to	 be	




of	 the	 Directive,	 authorise	 treatment	 to	 take	 place	 abroad	 and	 refund	 its	 cost.	 The	 ruling,	
however,	 also	 envisages	 a	 similar	 role	 for	 the	 domestic	 court.	 Thus,	 it	 is	 for	 the	 court	
undertaking	judicial	review	of	refusals	to	grant	authorisation	to	determine	whether	the	waiting	
time	on	the	NHS	exceeds	a	medically	acceptable	period	 in	the	 light	of	the	patient’s	particular	
condition	and	 clinical	 needs.	 In	order	 to	undertake	 this	 judicial	 review	 function	properly,	 the	
court,	 if	 it	 thinks	 it	 necessary,	 must	 be	 able	 to	 call	 on	 ‘wholly	 objective	 and	 impartial	
independent	 experts’	 (presumably	 medical	 experts).	 It	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 EU	
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Patients’	 Rights	 Directive	 does	 not	 reverse	 this	 depoliticisation;	 rather,	 by	 entrenching	 those	
aspects	of	the	Watts	case,	it	sustains	this	expropriation	via	law	and	medicine.	
Two	observations	can	be	made	regarding	 this	expropriation	of	politics,	via	 law	and	medicine,	
created	 by	 the	 ECJ	 in	 Watts.	 The	 first	 is	 that	 medical	 professionals	 and	 judges	 become	
extremely	 powerful	 players	 in	 determining	 both	 the	 types	 of	 political	 questions,	 issues,	 and	
conflicts	 relating	 to	 the	 liberalisation	of	hospital	 care	 services	within	 the	EU	 identified	earlier	
and	the	extent	to	which	this	political	project	materialises	in	practice.	The	degree	to	which	NHS	
resources	 flow	 to	other	EU	countries,	 thereby	 supporting	 liberalisation,	 lies	 very	much	 in	 the	
hands	of	medics	and	 lawyers.	This	has	 implications	 for	 the	traditional	 role	of	domestic	courts	
within	the	UK	when	deciding	disputed	cases	involving	the	allocation	of	scarce	NHS	resources	–	a	
role	that	touches	centrally	on	the	relationship	between	law	and	politics.	
When	dealing	with	 challenges	 to	decisions	made	by	health	authorities	or	primary	 care	 trusts	









the	 judgment	 of	 those	 who	 are	 responsible	 for	 the	 allocation	 of	 resources.’	 R	 v.	 Central	 Birmingham	 Health	
Authority,	ex	parte	Walker	 (1987)	3	BMLR	32,	at	32,	per	Sir	 John	Donaldson	MR.	While	 this	 restrained	approach	
















resources	 has	 not	 escaped	 critique.	 Keith	 Syrett,	 for	 instance,	 has	 argued	 that	 judges	 should	
undertake	their	judicial	review	function	more	rigorously,	and	to	much	greater	effect,	than	they	
have	done	to	date.64	In	Syrett’s	view,	courts	ought	to	ensure	that	those	empowered	to	allocate	
resources	 explain	 clearly,	 and	with	 the	 support	 of	 concrete	 evidence,	 the	 reasons	 why	 they	
decided	to	allocate	resources	as	they	did.	This	more	rigorous	judicial	approach	would	not	only	
render	decisions	about	allocation	transparent	to	both	the	individuals	affected	and	the	broader	
public;	 the	 public	 understanding	 of	 the	 basis	 of	 such	 decisions	 facilitated	 by	 this	would	 also	
work	to	strengthen	the	legitimacy	of	those	making	the	decisions.	 In	turn,	this	would	heighten	
the	possibility	of	democratic	debate	on	the	question	of	health	care	rationing.	This	exhortation	











characterisation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 law	 and	 politics	 described	 above.	 Rather,	 in	
suggesting	 that	 public	 law	 can	 work	 to	 enhance	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 public	 power,	 Syrett’s	
argument	 is	 consistent	 with	 the	 separation	 of	 the	 legal	 and	 the	 political	 underpinning	 this	
understanding	 of	 judicial	 review.	 Judges	 should	 not	 be	 exercising	 the	 type	 of	 political	 power	
involved	 in	determining	 the	 flow	of	 scarce	public	 health	 care	 resources.	 They	 should,	 rather,	
police	it,	and	the	processes	surrounding	its	exercise,	to	greater	effect	–	including	to	the	end	of	
enhancing	politics	and	the	political.	
In	 respect	 of	 patients	 whose	 legal	 challenge	 is	 directed	 towards	 their	 wish	 to	 obtain	 NHS	
treatment	 that	 has	 been	 denied	 them,	 there	would	 seem	 to	 be	 no	 reason	 to	 think	 that	 the	
Watts	 ruling	 would	 alter	 this	 understanding	 of	 the	 courts’	 judicial	 review	 role.	 However,	 in	
relation	to	applications	by	patients	seeking	to	challenge	refusals	of	prior	authorisation	by	their	
local	primary	care	 trust	 to	 travel	 to	another	EU	Member	State	 to	 receive	hospital	 treatment,	
the	ECJ’s	ruling	in	Watts	collapses	this	distinction	between	the	legal	and	the	political	inherent	in	
the	 traditional	 approach	 to	 the	 function	 of	 judicial	 review.	 This	 is	 because	 it	 is	 the	 domestic	
court	 that	 must	 determine	 whether	 the	 NHS	 waiting	 time	 for	 the	 relevant	 treatment	 upon	
which	 the	 refusal	 is	based	exceeds	a	medically	acceptable	period	 in	 the	 light	of	 the	patient’s	
particular	condition	and	clinical	needs.	This	role	goes	beyond	ascertaining	the	lawfulness	of	the	
refusal	(and,	 in	the	event	of	a	finding	of	unlawfulness,	referring	the	decision	back	to	the	local	
primary	 care	 trust	 for	 reconsideration),	 to	 ruling	 on	whether	 there	 has,	 in	 fact,	 been	 undue	
delay.	In	these	circumstances,	the	allocation	of	NHS	resources	will	depend	upon	the	nature	of	
this	 ruling.	 The	 result	 is	 a	 shift	 in	 the	 nature	 of	 judicial	 review	 from	 one	 displaying	 Poole’s	








the	determination	of	 these	political	matters	occurs	 in	a	depoliticised	manner.	 In	other	words,	
these	 fundamental	 political	matters	 are	not	only	wrenched	 from	 the	domain	of	 the	political;	
they	 are	 also,	 in	 the	 process,	 distorted	 as	 they	 become	 subjected	 to	 the	 medical	 and	 legal	
systems.	 So,	 for	 instance,	 the	 issue	 of	 whether	 UK	 taxpayers’	 money	 should	 be	 diverted	 to	
health	care	providers	abroad,	with	the	potential	consequences	for	NHS	patients,	Government	
finances	 and	 health	 care	 planning	 this	 entails,	 is	 converted	 into	 a	 question	 of	 the	 particular	
clinical	needs	of	 individual	patients	and	whether	 they	are	enduring	undue	delay	on	 the	NHS.	
Rendering	 the	 issue	of	 travelling	 to	another	EU	Member	State	 to	obtain	hospital	 treatment	a	
matter	of	clinical	and	judicial	judgment	serves	to	pre-empt	any	debate	amongst,	or	anticipatory	
resistance	by,	citizens	concerned	about	the	deployment	of	NHS	resources	to	the	furtherance	of	
the	 project	 of	 developing	 an	 EU	 internal	 market	 in	 hospital	 care	 services.	 The	 result	 is	 an	
instance	 of	Mathiesen’s	 ‘silent	 silencing’	 –	 the	 ability	 of	 law	 (and	 in	 this	 case	 medicine)	 ‘to	
transform	 political	 questions	 of	 conflict	 into	 apparently	 neutral,	 technical	 and	 professional	
questions’.65	 Thus,	 rather	 than	 facilitating	 the	 type	 of	 democratic	 debate	 on	 health	 care	







clinical	 judgment	 regarding	 particular	 patients’	 medical	 conditions	 and	 clinical	 histories	
resulting	 from	Watts	 and	 the	Directive	ensures	 that	 the	 function	of	 judicial	 review	will	 be	 to	
close	this	possibility	down.	
B.	 Expansion	of	Law,	the	NHS	and	Ambivalence	




therefore	established	 for	obtaining	access	 to	 these	 resources.	Of	 course,	 in	order	 for	 this	 EU	
legal	provision	to	be	effective,	it	must,	in	cases	where	a	system	of	prior	authorisation	is	in	place,	
first	be	established	 that	 the	 individual	 is	enduring	undue	delay.	Assuming,	however,	 that	 this	
can	 be	 proved,	 EU	 law	 effectively	 creates	 a	 new	 legal	 right	 to	 access	 NHS	 resources	 for	 the	
purpose	of	obtaining	hospital	treatment	–	something	that	has	not	been	a	part	of	domestic	law	
in	the	UK.	
Like	 Habermas’s	 observations	 in	 respect	 of	 the	 legal	 rights	 to	 the	 welfare	 state’s	 monetary	
benefits,	 this	 new	 EU	 legal	 entitlement	 to	 access	 hospital	 care	 outside	 one’s	 own	 Member	
State,	 and	 to	 be	 reimbursed	 for	 it,	 might	 be	 thought	 to	 have	 important	 consequences.	
However,	 unlike	 those	 Habermas	 identifies	 in	 his	 analysis	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 –	 the	
contradictory	 freedom-denying	 effect	 of	 legal	 entitlements	 designed	 to	 guarantee	 freedom,	
and	 the	 impact	 on	 communities	 of	 wrenching	 social	 issues	 from	 their	 social	 and	 historical	
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origins66	 –	 the	 locus	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 EU	 law,	 it	 is	 suggested,	 is	 to	 be	 found	 elsewhere.	 Of	
course,	the	political	implications	of	EU	law	here	–	discussed	above	–	clearly	represent	one	set	of	










solidary	basis	 results	not,	 to	use	Habermas’s	words,	as	a	side	effect	of	 juridification	but	 from	
the	 form	 of	 juridification	 itself.	 It	 is	 the	 novel	 application	 of	 an	 individual	 legal	 entitlement	
within	 EU	 law	 to	 an	 aspect	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 where	 no	 right	 has	 previously	 existed	 that	
endangers,	not	the	freedom	of	the	beneficiaries	that	Habermas	describes,	but	the	community	–	















EU	 legal	 entitlement	 is	 ambivalent.	 The	 nature	 of	 this	 ambivalence	 in	 the	 current	 context,	
however,	 differs	 from	 that	 described	 by	 Habermas.	 As	 we	 saw	 earlier,	 for	 Habermas	 the	




EU	 law	 fails	 to	 respect	 the	 solidary	 nature	 of	 the	 NHS,	 it	 nevertheless	 depends	 upon	 this	
welfare	 institution’s	 continued	 existence	 for	 its	 viability.	 The	 objective	 of	 creating	 and	
maintaining	an	internal	market	in	hospital	care	services	in	which	individuals	exercise	their	free	
movement	 rights	 to	 travel	 to	 other	 EU	Member	 States,	 relies	 upon	 the	 resources	 of	welfare	
state	 institutions.	 Liberalisation	has	 dependencies.	 Thus,	while	 being	 contrary	 to	 the	 solidary	
basis	 of	 the	 NHS,	 the	 practical	 implementation	 of	 this	 EU	 legal	 entitlement	 comes,	 like	 the	
beneficiaries	 Habermas	 describes,	 to	 depend	 on	 the	welfare	 state	 and	 public	 resources	 in	 a	
more	general	sense.	The	latter	describes	the	importance	of	what	might	be	called	public	wealth	
to	 the	 success	of	 the	 free	movement	provisions.	Of	 course,	 this	public	wealth	has	a	 financial	
component	–	the	publicly	funded	resources	allocated	to	the	NHS	by	central	Government.	But	it	
might	 also	 be	 thought	 to	 encompass	 a	 non-financial	 public	 resource	 or	 wealth	 too	 –	 for	
instance,	 the	 publicly	 funded	 doctors	 and	 judges	 whose	 responsibility	 it	 is	 to	 conduct	 the	
necessary	 objective	 medical	 assessments	 of	 individual	 patients’	 conditions	 with	 a	 view	 to	









That	 these	are	possible	 consequences	 flowing	 from	 the	Watts	 ruling	does	not	 seem	 to	be	 in	
doubt.	Szyszczak	argues	that	the	ECJ	has	sought	to	‘maximise	free	movement	rights	[those	legal	
rights	 underlying	 the	 liberalisation	of	 access	 to	 hospital	 care	 services]	 and	 give	 them	greater	
priority	as	market	opening	legal	tools’.69	Moreover,	she	suggests	that	free	movement	rules	tend	
to	assume,	rather	than	question,	 ‘that	services	relating	to	a	range	of	healthcare	provision	are	
‘economic’’.70	 Some	 evidence	 exists	 to	 suggest	 that	 this	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 be	 reflected	 in	
practice.	For	instance,	in	their	analysis	of	the	actual	impact	of	ECJ	rulings	on	patient	mobility	on	
national	health	care	systems	within	the	EU,	Baeten	et	al	describe	the	possibility	of	these	rulings	
being	 used	 either	 by	 domestic	 health	 care	 providers	 or	 governments	 to	 increase	 the	 role	 of	
commercial	 providers	 of	 health	 care	 in	 the	 treatment	 of	 patients.71	 This	 would	 allow	
governments	to	contract	out	the	provision	of	publicly	funded	health	care	to	private	providers,	
thereby	allowing	those	enduring	undue	delay	within	the	NHS	to	be	treated	domestically,	rather	
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Health	Guidance	 issued	 in	 the	 light	of	Watts	 speaks	of	 the	NHS	allowing	 for	planned	hospital	
care	abroad	after	prior	authorisation,	 it	does	not	rule	out	the	possibility	that	patients	may	be	
treated	outside	of	the	public	health	care	system	of	the	country	of	treatment	–	that	 is,	by	for-




elements	 that	 are	 involved	 in	 supporting	 the	 creation	of	 the	 internal	market	 in	hospital	 care	
services	and	the	potential	for	an	increased	role	for	private	health	care	providers.	In	particular,	
the	 ambivalent	 nature	 of	 the	 juridification	 arising	 from	 EU	 law	 raises	 questions	 about	
characterisations	 of	 the	 Watts	 case	 that	 detect	 in	 it	 a	 conflict	 or	 tension	 between	 the	
liberalisation	 of	 EU	 health	 care	 services	 (the	 market)	 and	 the	 social	 nature	 of	 the	 right	
established	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 accessing	 these	 services	 (the	 social).	 Davies,	 for	 instance,	 has	
argued	that	the	case	discloses	a	theme	of	 ‘the	gradual	development	of	social	rights	[the	near	
right	to	adequate	medical	care]	in	Community	law,	in	an	attempt	to	balance	the	claimed	market	
bias.’72	 As	 noted,	 there	 is	 no	doubt	 that	Watts,	 and	now	 the	Directive,	 creates	 a	 conditional	
legal	 right	 to	 access	 hospital	 care	 in	 other	 EU	 Member	 States.	 But	 this	 social-market	
interpretative	framework,	which,	through	its	idea	of	the	need	to	balance	these	two	elements,	
views	them	as	somehow	in	conflict,	is	in	need	of	critical	analysis.	In	one	sense,	this	is	because	











In	 another	 sense,	 and	 as	 already	 noted,	 the	 social-market	 distinction	 fails	 to	 capture	 the	
indispensability	of	a	welfare	institution	like	the	NHS	to	the	success	of	a	market	in	hospital	care	
services.	As	no	EU	health	care	budget	from	which	funds	can	be	drawn	exists,	patients	must	be	
funded	 by	 their	 domestic	 health	 care	 systems	 to	 travel	 abroad,	 thereby	 enabling	 the	








ones	 by	 means	 of	 dispossession	 –	 EU	 law	 rather	 puts	 in	 place	 the	mechanisms	 required	 to	
facilitate	 the	periodic	extraction	of	 resources	 from	a	continuing	 system	of	public	wealth.	The	
public	resources	and	services	of	the	NHS	are	not	in	any	way	privatised	as	a	result	of	EU	law	(as	
noted	earlier,	Member	 States	 are	 to	 retain	 the	 right	 to	determine	 the	nature	of	 their	 health	




support	 the	 EU	 internal	 market	 in	 hospital	 care	 services,	 including,	 potentially	 at	 least,	 the	
profits	of	commercial	health	care	providers.	Relying	on	the	private	resources	of	 individuals	to	
sustain	 this	 market	 and	 those	 types	 of	 provider,	 especially	 given	 the	 current	 financial	
predicament	 of	many	 European	Member	 States,	would	 not	 be	 a	 viable	 option.	 And	 it	 is	 this	
financial	component	of	the	flow	of	public	wealth	which	is	to	be	organised,	or	managed,	by	its	
other,	 institutional,	 facet	 –	 the	 public	 systems	 and	 servants	 of	 law	 and	medicine.	What	 the	
ambivalent	nature	of	the	juridification	to	be	found	here	helps	to	reveal,	then,	is	the	structured	
nature	of	liberalisation	–	the	latter’s	manifestation	being	the	development	of	the	EU’s	internal	
market	 in	 hospital	 care	 services,	 together	 with	 the	 prospect	 for	 increased	 commercial	
involvement	 in	 its	operation.	 Like	all	markets,	 this	market	does	not	 spring	up	 from	nowhere.	
Rather,	 its	 creation	 and	 sustenance	 requires,	 and	 depends	 upon,	 structures	 and	 institutional	
bases.73	 In	 the	 current	 context,	 these	 take	 the	 form	 of	 law,	medicine,	 and	 the	 public	 funds	
allocated	to	the	NHS.	
C.	 Juridification,	Medicalisation	and	Bureaucracy	
This	 brings	 us	 to	 a	 final	 observation	 regarding	 the	 relationship	 between	 juridification,	
medicalisation,	 and	 EU	 law	 on	 patient	 mobility.	 It	 was	 noted	 earlier	 in	 the	 article	 that	 a	
common	 theme	 of	 Habermas’s	 juridification	 and	 McLean’s	 and	 Illich’s	 understandings	 of	












of	 individual	 power	 and	 freedom	as	 a	 result	 of	 the	welfare	 state’s	wrenching	 of	 a	 variety	 of	
issues	 (including	 health,	 illness,	 and	 old	 age)	 from	 their	 social	 conditions	 of	 origin	 and	 their	
transfer	to	the	workings	of	 the	bureaucratic	state.	Habermas	sums	this	up	when	he	says	that	
‘legalized	social	intervention’	transfers	such	issues	‘over	to	media	such	as	power	and	money’.	
In	 the	 light	 of	 Watts	 and	 the	 Directive,	 it	 is	 suggested	 that	 it	 is	 necessary	 partially	 to	
reformulate	this	understanding	of	juridification	and	medicalisation.	For	while	it	is	true	that	the	
exercise	 of	 the	 legal	 right	 to	 access	 hospital	 care	 within	 the	 EU	 depends	 on	 the	 clinical	
assessment	of	an	individual’s	medical	condition	by	the	medical	and	legal	professions,	from	the	
foregoing	 discussion	 the	 ends	 to	 which	 this	 is	 directed	 are	 not	 the	 empowerment	 of	
professionals	and	 the	efficient	 functioning	of	 the	bureaucratic	welfare	state	per	 se.	They	are,	
instead,	 and	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 empowerment	 of	 individuals,	 and	 on	 the	 other,	 the	
development	 of	 the	 internal	market	 and,	 at	 least	 potentially,	 the	 facilitation	 of	 an	 increased	
role	 for	 commercial	 health	 care	 providers	 in	 the	provision	of	 publicly	 funded	health	 care.	Of	
course,	 these	 alternative	 ends	 do	 not	 negate	 the	 need	 for	 an	 efficiently	 functioning	welfare	
state	and	the	public	servants	and	institutions	entrusted	with	its	management;	indeed,	quite	the	
opposite	–	as	noted,	the	medical	and	legal	systems,	together	with	NHS	funds,	will	be	integral	in	
contributing	 to	 the	 attainment	 of	 these	 objectives.	 Moreover,	 the	 ‘power	 and	 money’	
Habermas	refers	to	in	his	analysis	of	juridification	and	the	welfare	state	cannot	be	confined	to	
describing	 the	 monetary	 benefits	 distributed	 by	 the	 welfare	 state	 or	 the	 pursuit	 of	 its	
administrative	 ends;	 they	 must,	 in	 light	 of	 the	 relevant	 EU	 law,	 instead	 be	 rethought	 and	
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extended	 to	 include	 the	 power	 of	 liberalisation	 and	 markets,	 and	 the	 profit	 margins	 of	
commercial	health	care	providers.74	
The	implications	of	this	for	the	critique	of	medicalisation	undertaken	by	McLean	and	Illich	are	
mixed.	 Thus,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 law	 does,	 through	 the	 application	 of	 the	 free	 movement	
provisions,	empower	patients	by	giving	them	a	 legal	entitlement	to	access	hospital	 treatment	
within	 the	EU	 if	 they	are	enduring	undue	delay	within	 the	NHS.	By	paying	due	 regard	 to	 the	
individual’s	 particular	 medical	 circumstances,	 rather	 than	 the	 financial	 consequences	 of	
treatment	 abroad	 for	 the	management	 of	 the	 NHS,	 EU	 law	 addresses	 the	 de-individualising	
effect	 of	 medicalisation	 critiqued	 by	 Illich	 and	 McLean.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 however,	 this	
individualisation	 constitutes	 a	 mixed	 blessing	 as	 it	 remains	 tied	 up	 with	 the	 medical	 and	
dependent	upon	 the	clinical	assessments	of	members	of	 the	medical	profession.	Perhaps	 the	
key	 observation	 to	 be	 made	 about	 the	 implications	 of	 EU	 law	 on	 patient	 mobility	 for	 the	
critiques	of	medicalisation	advanced	by	Illich	and	McLean,	however,	is	not	so	much	the	degree	
to	 which	 this	 law	 addresses	 these	 authors’	 specific	 concerns,	 but	 what	 it	 reveals	 about	 the	
limitations	 of	 their	 ideas	 of	 medicalisation.	 For	 as	 conceived	 by	 Illich	 and	 McLean,	
medicalisation	 is	 intimately	 connected	 to	morality	 and	 ethics.	 The	 critique	 of	medicine’s	 de-
individualising	 characteristics	 targets,	 centrally,	 the	 failure	 to	 leave	 individuals	 alone	 so	 that	














medicalisation	by	 identifying	a	critical	 link	between	medicine,	markets,	 liberalisation,	and	 the	
potential	 for	 a	 greater	 role	 for	 commercial	 health	 care	 providers	 in	 the	 provision	 of	 publicly	
funded	hospital	care	services.	Here,	 it	 is	not	 the	medicine-ethics-patient	 liberty	 link	that	 is	so	






bureaucratic	 or	 technical	 nature	 bound	 up	 with	 promoting	 a	 market	 in	 EU	 hospital	 care	
services?	What	 is	the	relation	of	 law	to	medicalisation	where	economic	 issues,	as	opposed	to	
ethical-liberal	 ones,	 are	 concerned?	 In	 short,	 in	 order	 to	 think	 through	 the	 nature	 of	








receipt,	 of	 health	 care	 services	 within	 the	 EU.	 More	 specifically,	 it	 draws	 the	 NHS	 into	 this	
pursuit	of	the	objective	of	liberalisation	and	confirms	that	its	resources	–	financial	and	human	–	
can	be	deployed	 to	 further	 it.	 It	has	been	argued	 that	 the	architecture	 the	ECJ,	and	now	the	
Directive,	have	put	in	place	to	facilitate	the	NHS’s	involvement	masks	or	depoliticises	the	types	
of	 fundamental	 political	 issues	 outlined	 in	 this	 article.	 This	 occurs	 by	 converting	 these	 issues	
into	a	technical	matter	revolving	around	the	assessment	of	the	clinical	conditions	and	needs	of	
individual	 patients,	 and	 a	 judgment	 as	 to	whether	 they	 are	 suffering	undue	delay	within	 the	
NHS.	 Clearly,	 medical	 professionals	 have	 a	 key	 role	 to	 play	 here.	 But	 it	 is	 the	 law,	 too,	
specifically	 public	 law,	 via	 an	 extension	 of	 the	 judicial	 review	 function	 of	 domestic	 courts	 in	
those	cases	where	patients	have	been	refused	prior	authorisation	to	receive	hospital	treatment	
abroad,	that	becomes	 involved	 in	determining	the	presence	of	undue	delay	–	and	thus	 in	the	
depoliticisation	this	entails.	The	result	is	an	ironic	one:	the	furtherance	of	the	political	project	of	
liberalising	access	to	EU	health	care	services	is	founded	upon	depoliticising	mechanisms.	It	has	
been	 argued	 that	 this	 application	 of	 EU	 law	 has	 additional,	 and	 broader,	 ramifications	 –	






means,	 inter	 alia,	 of	 critiquing	 the	 freedom-denying	 and	 bureaucratic	 characteristics	 of	 the	
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welfare	 state	 –	 may,	 as	 concepts,	 require	 updating	 and	 reformulating	 so	 as	 to	 capture	
contemporary	 legal	 developments	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 the	medical	 and	 health	 care	 spheres.	 In	
particular,	 it	 is	 the	 economic	 aspect	 of	 those	 developments	 and	 its	 impact	 on	 traditional	
understandings	of	the	role	of	the	welfare	state	(the	NHS)	and	what	has	here	been	called	public	
wealth,	that	the	notions	of	juridification	and	medicalisation	must	seek	to	explain	today.	
